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In order to understand the ideas on the self and on meditation in early 
Buddhism and in some other contemporary Indian religions, one has to 
take into consideration the doctrine of karma as it existed at that time. This 
doctrine is older than Buddhism, and constitutes the background for other 
religious movements of ancient India besides Buddhism. There are few 
records describing the doctrine of karma in its earliest form, but the 
evidence we have supports the following presentation. 
 Deeds constitute the decisive factor that cause rebirth to take place 
and that determine what the new life will be like: good deeds lead to a good 
rebirth, bad deeds to a bad one. The religious movements of ancient India 
that accepted this fundamental belief shared in common that their highest 
aspiration was not to obtain a good rebirth, but to avoid any rebirth 
whatsoever. How could this aspiration be realised? Moral behaviour would 
obviously not be of any help, given that good deeds were thought to lead to 
rebirth, even a good one. What, if not deeds of some kind, could prevent 
rebirth from taking place? 
                                                
1 This article draws heavily on my earlier publications, esp. The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient 
India (2nd edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993); The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism (Peter 
Lang, Bern, 1993; 2nd edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998); "The Buddha and the Jainas 
reconsidered" (AS 49(2), 1995, 333-350); "Dharma and Abhidharma" (BSOAS 48 (1985), pp. 305-320); 
"Remarks on the history of Jaina meditation" (Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu, ed. Rudy Smet and 
Kenji Watanabe, Tokyo: Hon-no-Tomosha, 1993, pp. 151-162); "Die Buddhistische Lehre" (Der indische 
Buddhismus und seine Verzweigungen, Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 24,1, Verlag W. 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2000); "Did the Buddha believe in karma and rebirth?" (JIABS 21(1), 1998); 
"Zur Genese des Buddhismus in seinem geschichtlichen Kontext. Proprium — Abgrenzung gegenüber 
hinduistischen Traditionen und Jinismus" (Der Buddhismus als Anfrage an christliche Theologie und 
Philosophie, ed. Andreas Bsteh, Mödling: St. Gabriel, 2000). These publications contain full references to 
the original texts. 
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 Two solutions presented themselves. The first one is as simple as it 
is straightforward. If deeds bring about rebirth, one will have to abstain 
from all activities whatsoever if one wants to prevent rebirth from taking 
place. This solution requires people aspiring for liberation to engage in as-
cetic practices in which motionlessness of body and mind plays a central 
role. Indeed, perfect liberation will be obtained by the ascetic who manages 
to immobilise his body and mind completely right until death. Death will 
be hastened by the fact that the ascetic abstains from eating and, during the 
last minutes of his life, from breathing. There is certainly the added 
complication that deeds carried out before the ascetic enters his immobile 
life-style will still carry fruit. These deeds, however, were believed to reach 
fruition in the painful experiences which the ascetic evokes by his difficult 
life-style. The store of earlier deeds having been exhausted, the ascetic can 
concentrate on his death, which he invites through fasting and the 
interruption of breathing, as I said above. The moment of death is, for the 
successful ascetic, also his moment of liberation. 
 A different solution was accepted by others. If the deeds of persons 
bring about their rebirth, it becomes important to know which deeds really 
belong to a person and which don't. This entails the question: what exactly 
is the person? A number of thinkers answered that the real self of a person 
is different from all that acts. The real self is different from the body to 
begin with, but also different from the mind, and from whatever else that 
acts for that matter. The self is by its very nature immobile, motionless and 
actionless. Once one realises this, one distantiates oneself automatically 
from all parts of the personality that act, and therefore from one's deeds. 
More precisely, one realises that no deeds whatsoever belong to the person, 
i.e., to oneself. Those who have this insight know that in reality they never 
act, and that they cannot therefore be reborn as a result of their deeds. The 
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knowledge that they — in deepest reality — never act, and that there are 
therefore no deeds that belong to them that could bring about a new birth, 
liberates those who have this knowledge once and for all. The nature of this 
solution, unlike the first one, is such that liberation can be reached before 
death. Insight is obtained while alive, so people who have definitely 
reached it will be alive for at least some time after the event. 
 The first of the two solutions which I have presented finds its 
clearest and least watered down expression in the texts of early Jainism. 
These texts celebrate the motionless ascetic and the conscious choice of 
death through starvation. They describe the ever increasing control of body 
and mind, until nothing moves any longer in the ascetic, neither in his body 
nor in his mind. These same texts also point out how the culmination of 
this life-style, i.e. voluntary death through starvation, is accompanied by 
the suppression of breathing. But the Jaina texts are not the only ones that 
glorify the immobilisation of body and mind. Early Hindu texts, such as 
certain Vedic SËtras and portions of the Mahåbhårata, present a very 
similar picture, although it is usually less detailed. 
 The idea of an inactive self, knowledge of which is a precondition 
for liberation, is an almost omnipresent theme of classical Hinduism. It 
makes its appearance in the early Upani∑ads (which may have borrowed it 
from others). It is a recurring theme in the Mahåbhårata, and it is the very 
basis of many subsequent developments of Hinduism, including in 
particular all the Brahmanical schools of philosophy. 
 The doctrine of karma as I have described it existed already at the 
time of the Buddha, as did the two solutions which I have mentioned. It 
seems certain that the Buddha did not accept the doctrine in this form. For 
him it is not deeds, i.e. physical and mental movements, which determine 
one's fate, but what is behind deeds. The early Buddhist texts speak again 
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and again of thirst or desire (t®∑ˆå) as the root problem, rather than mere 
deeds. On some rare occasions they identify deeds with intention (cetanå).2 
A deed that was not carried out in spite of strong desire would nevertheless 
leave its karmic traces, and a deed that was carried out without intention — 
perhaps by mistake — would not. In other words, the doctrine of karma 
accepted by the Buddha was in one fundamental respect quite different 
from that accepted by other religious movements of his time.3 This had an 
unmistakable consequence. The two solutions current among the other 
movements could not possibly be acceptable to the Buddha. 
Immobilisation of the body would have no effect as long as desire had not 
yet been removed. Much the same could be said about insight into the true 
nature of an inactive self. Deeds were for the Buddha less important than 
the psychological states that might, or might not, bring them about. The 
challenge faced by the Buddha was not, therefore, to stop deeds, but to deal 
with the psychology of the person concerned. 
 It follows from what precedes that the solution offered by the 
Buddha had to be different from the two described earlier. His solution had 
to be different, and it had to be psychological. Indeed, unlike the other 
religious movements of his day, the Buddha taught a form of meditation 
with the aim of bringing about a radical change in the psychological 
makeup of its practitioners. This radical change could be brought about 
during the life-time of the person concerned, so it was believed, and the 
Buddha himself presented himself as someone in whom it had taken place.4 
                                                
2 AN III.415. 
3 Richard Gombrich ("The Buddhist attitude to thaumaturgy," Bauddhavidyåsudhåkara˙: Studies in 
Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe 
Hartmann, Swisttal-Odendorf 1997 (IndTib 30), pp. 165-184) is right in emphasising the revolutionary 
nature of the Buddha's theory of karma, but no doubt wrong in suggesting that before his time primarily 
ritual acts were believed to be responsible for continual rebirth (p. 171). See also the chapter "Kamma as 
a reaction to Brahminism" in Gombrich's book How Buddhism Began: The conditioned genesis of the 
early teachings (London & Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Athlone, 1996 (Jordan Lectures 1994), pp. 27-64). 
4 Some scholars seem to have missed this point. Oskar v. Hinüber ("Old age and old monks in Påli 
Buddhism," Aging, Asian Concepts and Experiences, Past and Present, ed. Susanne Formanek and Sepp 
Linhart, Wien: ÖAW, 1997 (SAWW 643), pp. 65-78), for example, writes (p. 67) that "the Buddha ... 
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 I have so far used the words self and meditation a few times. The self 
— and more in particular the conviction that the self, by its very nature, 
does not act — played an essential role in one solution to the problem 
resulting from the conviction that physical and mental deeds are 
responsible for rebirth. Since the Buddha did not recognise the problem, he 
rejected the solution. Knowledge of the self plays no role on his path to 
liberation. Because the Buddha did not accept that deeds themselves are 
responsible for rebirth, his method was, and had to be, psychological. Part 
of his method was a certain kind of meditation which supposedly allowed 
its practitioner to bring about the requisite psychological changes. It will 
now be clear that the items that figure in the title of this lecture — self and 
meditation — have something to do with each other. The Buddha 
introduced a psychological method of which meditation was part, because 
he rejected knowledge of the self as a way toward liberation. 
 At this point I may have to clarify some points. To begin with, the 
early texts are not so clear as to whether the existence of a self is rejected 
or not by the Buddha. Much has been written about this issue, without a 
clear and unambiguous solution in sight so far. Most convincing is 
probably Claus Oetke5 who, at the end of a long and painstaking enquiry, 
arrives at the conclusions that the early texts neither accept nor reject the 
self. Fortunately we do not have to take position in this debate. Whether or 
not the Buddha accepted the existence of a self, it is certain that he did not 
preach knowledge of the self as an essential element of the path to 
liberation. His path was different, and meditation had an important role to 
play in it. 
                                                                                                                                         
spent half a century striving for enlightenment and teaching before he finally entered nirvåˆa at the age of 
80". 
5 "Ich" und das Ich. Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ótmankontroverse, 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1988 (ANISt 33), pp. 59-242. 
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 A further point to be dealt with concerns meditation in early Jainism. 
I have argued that the path of early Jainism consisted in the immobilisation 
of body and mind. The early Jaina texts do sometimes use the term dhyåna, 
which is often translated ‘meditation’. A closer inspection reveals however 
that this term is used precisely for the mental immobilisation which is part 
of the total immobilisation of body and mind typical of Jainism and parallel 
movements. ‘Meditation’ may not be a very appropriate translation for 
dhyåna in this context, and the difference with the Buddhist use of the term 
is beyond doubt. 
 It should be clear, then, that the attitude of the Buddha with regard to 
self and meditation had much to do with his understanding of the doctrine 
of karma. Yet there are indications that his psychological understanding of 
this doctrine caused confusion and misunderstanding among his followers. 
At least some of the early Buddhists, many of whom may have been re-
cruited from surroundings where the other understanding of the doctrine of 
karma held sway, appear to have somehow missed this important feature of 
the Buddha's teaching. They held on to the view that deeds themselves 
(rather than the desires that inspire them) lead to rebirth, and consequently 
they felt attracted to the two solutions described above. Already the old SË-
tras describe some practices and beliefs that fit the physical interpretation 
of the doctrine of karma much better than the psychological one. We find 
feats of immobilisation glorified, and mental exercises which appear to 
have had no other aim than to immobilise the mind. What is more, we find 
the view that insight into the true nature of the self leads to liberation 
reintroduced, but in a modified form. Let us consider this last point first. 
 As pointed out above, knowledge of the true nature of the self was 
believed (by certain non-Buddhists) to lead to liberation because it implied 
distantiation from all that is active in body and mind. Such a liberating 
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knowledge, as we have seen, was not recognised by the Buddha. Now 
listen to the following passage from the second sermon attributed to the 
Buddha:6 
 
Then the Lord addressed the group of five monks, saying: "Matter (rËpa), 
monks, is not self. Now were this matter self, monks, this matter would not tend 
to sickness, and one might get the chance of saying in regard to matter, ‘Let 
matter become thus for me, let matter not become thus for me’. But inasmuch, 
monks, as matter is not self, therefore matter tends to sickness, and one does not 
get the chance of saying in regard to matter, ‘Let matter become thus for me, let 
matter not become thus for me’." The same words are then repeated with regard 
to the remaining four constituents of the person (skandha), viz. feeling (vedanå), 
ideation (saµjñå), the habitual tendencies (saµskåra), consciousness (vijñåna). 
The Buddha then continues: 
 "What do you think about this, monks? Is matter permanent or impermanent?" 
 "Impermanent, Lord." 
 "But is that which is impermanent suffering or bliss?" 
 "Painful, Lord." 
 "But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, painful, of a nature to 
change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?" 
 "It is not, Lord." 
 
 The same words are then repeated, this time in connection with the 
remaining four constituents (skandha) of the person. 
 In order to correctly appreciate this passage, recall that matter (rËpa), 
feeling (vedanå), ideation (saµjñå), the habitual tendencies (saµskåra), and 
consciousness (vijñåna) are the five constituents (skandha) of a person. To-
                                                
6 Vin I.13 f.; tr. BD 4 p. 20 f., modified. 
SELF AND MEDITATION IN INDIAN BUDDHISM  8 
 
 
gether they constitute the person's body and mind. This passage points out 
that with regard to none of these one can say ‘This is mine, this am I, this is 
my self’. Scholars have often wondered what this teaches us about the ac-
ceptance or otherwise of the self by the Buddha, but this question does not 
interest us at present. The passage primarily states that one is not identical 
with any of these constituents. This, in its turn, implies that one should not 
identify with one's body and mind. And this is precisely what knowledge of 
the true and inactive nature of the self was supposed to bring about among 
those who accepted that as a path to liberation. 
 This conclusion is confirmed by the sequel of the sermon, which 
reads: 
 
Seeing in this way, monks, the instructed disciple of the ariyans turns away from 
matter and he turns away from feeling and he turns away from ideation and he 
turns away from the habitual tendencies and he turns away from consciousness; 
turning away he is dispassionate; through dispassion he is freed; in the freed one 
the knowledge comes to be: ‘I am freed’, and he knows: Birth has been 
destroyed, the pure life has been lived, what was to be done has been done, so 
that there is no more return here. 
 
It is easy to see that the liberating insight into the true nature of the self has 
here been replaced by another liberating insight, that of non-self. The 
monks who have heard this sermon and obtained this insight reach 
immediate liberation: 
 
Thus spoke the Lord; delighted, the group of five monks rejoiced in what the 
Lord had said. Moreover while this discourse was being uttered (imasmiñ ca 
pana veyyåkaraˆasmiµ bhaññamåne), the minds of the group of five monks 
SELF AND MEDITATION IN INDIAN BUDDHISM  9 
 
 
were freed from the intoxicants without grasping. At that time there were six 
perfected ones (arhat) in the world. 
 
The mere fact of hearing this wisdom proclaimed was apparently enough 
for the five monks to reach instant liberation. 
 I hope it becomes clear that, and why, the idea of knowledge of the 
true nature of the self as a precondition for liberation exerted an attraction 
already on the early Buddhists, among them the composer, or redactor, of 
this part of the Buddha's first sermon. However, at this early period 
knowledge of the self could not be accepted as liberating insight in 
Buddhism. We may assume that the rejection by the Buddha of this 
particular solution was still in the minds of his followers. As a result they 
introduced this solution through a backdoor: they introduced knowledge of 
non-self rather than knowledge of self as liberating insight. 
 
 The idea of an inactive self continued to exert an attraction on the 
Buddhists. It finds expression in the so-called tathågatagarbha doctrine of 
Mahåyåna Buddhism. The similarity between the tathågatagarbha of 
certain Buddhists and the self of certain non-Buddhists was so striking that 
one Buddhist text comments upon it. The following passage occurs in the 
La∫kåvatåra SËtra. The Bodhisattva Mahåmati addresses the following 
question to the Buddha:7 
 
You describe the tathågatagarbha as brilliant by nature and pure by its purity 
etc., possessing the thirty-two signs [of excellence], and present in the bodies of 
all beings; it is enveloped in a garment of skandhas, dhåtus and åyatanas, like a 
                                                
7 La∫kåv(V) 2.137, p. 33 l. 10 ff. The word kartå at the end of Mahåmati's question has been corrected 
into akartå ‘non-active’; only this reading makes sense; it is moreover confirmed by the Tibetan 
translation (Taipei edition vol. 10, folio 86a), as I have been informed by T. Tillemans. 
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gem of great value which is enveloped in a dirty garment; it is soiled with 
passion, hatred, confusion and false imagination, and described by the venerable 
one as eternal, stable, auspicious and without change. Why is this doctrine of the 
tathågatagarbha not identical with the doctrine of the åtman of the non-
Buddhists? Also the non-Buddhists preach a doctrine of the åtman which is 
eternal, non-active, without attributes, omnipresent and imperishable. 
 
 The Buddha's answer does not interest us at present. An attempt is 
made to show that there is, after all, a difference between the 
tathågatagarbha of the Buddhists and the åtman of the non-Buddhists. The 
main point is that the two were so close that even Buddhists started 
wondering what the difference was. Clearly, the idea of an inactive self had 
maintained its attraction for the Buddhists of this later period. 
 
 At this point something has to be said about the pudgala, the notion 
of the person or self that came to be accepted by the so-called 
Pudgalavådins. The pudgala is to be distinguished from the self I have 
talked about so far. The pudgala was not believed to be inactive; 
knowledge of the true nature of the pudgala could not therefore guarantee 
or be a precondition for liberation. Quite on the contrary, the pudgala was 
thought of as neither identical with nor different from the skandhas, the 
constituents of the person. It appears to have been conceived of as the 
whole of those constituents. Many other Buddhists, especially those 
belonging to the Abhidharma schools, had such a concept of the person. 
They certainly rejected this concept, whereas the Pudgalavådins accepted 
it. It must however be recalled that what these Buddhists rejected, and what 
the Pudgalavådins accepted, was something quite different from the notion 
of an inactive self which we have been discussing so far. The Buddha had 
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rejected knowledge of the inactive self as an essential step on the road to 
liberation, and later Buddhists reintroduced this notion, first through a 
back-door (as knowledge of the non-self), then in the form of the 
tathågatagarbha. The notion of the pudgala was not yet important at the 
time of the Buddha, and may indeed not have evolved until much later, 
when Abhidharma systematically analysed the person and everything else 
there is. The rejection by these Buddhists of the pudgala should not 
therefore be confused with the rejection of the inactive self. 
 
 After these reflections about the self let us now turn to meditation. It 
has already been pointed out that in the way preached by the Buddha 
meditation played a central role. The most important part is constituted by 
the so-called Four Dhyånas, which follow a long series of preparatory 
exercises in which mindfulness (sm®ti) plays an important role. The Four 
Dhyånas are described as follows in the Mahåsaccaka SËtra:8 
 
Then indeed, Aggivessana, having taken ample food, and having recovered 
strength, being separated from desires, separated from bad things, I reached the 
First Dhyåna, which is accompanied by thought and reflection, born from 
separation, and consists of joy and bliss, and resided [there]. ... 
As a result of appeasing thought and reflection I reached the Second Dhyåna, 
which is an inner tranquillisation, a unification of the mind, free from thought 
and reflection, consisting of joy and bliss that is born from concentration 
(samådhija), and resided [there]. ... 
As a result of detachment from joy, I remained indifferent, attentive and mindful. 
I experienced with my body the bliss which the noble ones describe [in these 
                                                
8 MN I.247. 
SELF AND MEDITATION IN INDIAN BUDDHISM  12 
 
 
terms]: ‘indifferent, with attentiveness, residing in bliss’; thus I reached the 
Third Dhyåna and resided [there]. ... 
As a result of abandoning bliss, and abandoning pain, as a result of the earlier 
disappearance of cheerfulness and dejection, I reached the Fourth Dhyåna, which 
is free from pain and bliss, the complete purity of equanimity and attentiveness, 
and resided [there]. .... 
 
It is important to remember that these meditative states are not presented as 
aims in themselves. The aim, as always in the early Buddhist texts, is 
liberation; this in its turn is the result of a psychological transformation that 
can only take place in meditative trance, in the Fourth Dhyåna to be 
precise. This psychological transformation, which is the result of a 
liberating insight, is described as follows:9 
 
Because he knows this and sees this, his mind is liberated from the taints (three 
kinds of taints are enumerated, which I leave out, JB). Once [his mind] is freed, 
the insight arises in him: "I am freed". "Rebirth is destroyed, the sacred life has 
been lived, what had to be done has been done, so that I will not return here." 
This is what he knows. 
 
It will be clear that liberation here is not the result of meditation itself, but 
of a psychological transformation which the meditator brings about in this 
meditative state. This implies that this meditative state, and the Four 
Dhyånas in general, are not totally devoid of mental activity. This is 
exactly what we would expect, for immobilisation of the mind was no aim 
of the Buddha. His answer to rebirth as a result of action was not inaction, 
but psychological transformation. This psychological transformation takes 
                                                
9 E.g. MN I.23 
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place as the result of an important insight. Regarding the nature of this 
insight the text offer many different answers. There is indeed reason to 
believe that the earliest tradition had no precise information as to its 
content. This, in its turn, is not very surprising if we take into account that 
this insight was obtained and brought about its effect, liberation, in a state 
which nowadays would be called an "altered state of consciousness". 
 However, many contemporaries of the Buddha did not agree with the 
idea of psychological transformation as precondition for liberation, as we 
have seen. Nor did some of his early followers. They were tempted by that 
other understanding of the doctrine of karma in which karma is activity, 
and liberation from its effects takes place as a result of inaction. Practices 
relating to that other understanding of the doctrine of karma were therefore 
introduced into Buddhism, and among these there are meditational 
practices of a different kind. 
 Let us first consider some physical practices. Non-Buddhist ascetics 
cultivated total control of the senses, so much so that their functioning 
could be completely suppressed. No such suppression was advocated by 
the Buddha, and indeed, at least one Buddhist SËtra (the Indriyabhåvanå 
Sutta of the Påli canon and its parallel in Chinese translation) ridicules the 
kind of so-called ‘cultivation of the senses’ which leads to their non-func-
tioning; the Buddha is here reported to say that if this is cultivation of the 
senses, the blind and deaf would be cultivators of the senses. And yet, in 
the Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra, in its various recensions, where a discussion 
with someone called Putkasa (in Sanskrit) or Pukkusa (in Påli) is recorded, 
the Buddha is presented as boasting that once, in a violent thunderstorm 
when lightning killed two farmers and four oxen nearby him, he did not 
notice it. We must assume that this apocryphal story reflects the admiration 
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that, in spite of the Buddha, certain Buddhists felt for these kinds of 
abilities. 
 Clearer, and even more surprising, is the fact that sometimes the 
Buddha himself is credited with practices which we can recognise as being 
typical of early Jainism, and which certain Buddhist text indeed ascribe to 
Jainas and criticise as such. For example, a SËtra of the Majjhima Nikåya 
(the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta) and its parallels in Chinese translation de-
scribe and criticise the Jainas as practising ‘annihilation of former actions 
by asceticism’ and ‘non-performing of new actions’. This is an accurate de-
scription of the practices of the Jainas. But several other SËtras of the 
Buddhist canon put almost the same words in the mouth of the Buddha, 
who here approves of these practices. We conclude from this contradiction 
that non-Buddhist practices — this time it clearly concerns Jaina practices 
— had come to be accepted by at least some Buddhists, and ascribed to the 
Buddha himself. 
 The appeal of these practices remained strong, even centuries later. 
As late a text as the third Bhåvanåkrama of Kamalaß¥la (8th century C.E.) 
criticises the following opinion:10 
 
A certain [teacher] has the following opinion: "It is because of the force of good 
and bad deeds (ßubhåßubhakarman), produced through mental construction 
(cittavikalpa), that sentient beings (sattva) revolve in the round of existences 
(saµsåra), experiencing the fruits of deeds (karmaphala) such as heaven 
(svargådi). Those who on the contrary neither think on anything (na kiµcic cin-
tayanti) nor perform any deed whatever are completely freed (parimuc-) from 
the round of existences. Therefore nothing is to be thought on (na kiµcic 
                                                
10 MBT III, pp. 13-14; tr. David Seyfort Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in 
a Comparative Perspective: On the transmission and reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet, London: 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989 (Jordan Lectures 1987), p. 93. 
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cintayitavyam), nor is salutary conduct (kußalacaryå) consisting in generosity 
and the like (dånådi) to be practised. It is only in respect to foolish people 
(mËrkhajana) that salutary conduct consisting in generosity and the like has been 
indicated (nirdi∑†å)." 
 
The same opinion is further characterised in these words: "No deed what-
ever, salutary or otherwise, is to be performed" (na kiµcit kußalådikarma 
kartavyam). 
 We have seen that non-Buddhists practised asceticism in order to 
evoke painful experiences which were taken to be the fruition of earlier 
deeds. The Buddha had rejected this notion as well as the need for painful 
asceticism. However, the traditional biography of the Buddha before his 
enlightenment, i.e., when he was still Bodhisattva, includes a long period 
of severe asceticism. It has been pointed out, most recently by Minoru 
Hara,11 that a number of accounts of the life of the Buddha depict his pre-
enlightenment asceticism as a way to deliver him from defilement incurred 
in an earlier existence. 
 The practices which were introduced, or attempted to be introduced, 
into Buddhism did not only concern suppression of bodily action and of the 
senses. Suppression of mental activity, too, is prominent. Consider first the 
following. 
 The Vitakkasanthåna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya and its parallels 
in Chinese translation recommend the practising monk to ‘restrain his 
thought with his mind, to coerce and torment it’. Exactly the same words 
are used elsewhere in the Påli canon (in the Mahåsaccaka Sutta, 
Bodhiråjakumåra Sutta and Sa∫gårava Sutta) in order to describe the futile 
                                                
11 Minoru Hara, "A note on the Buddha's asceticism: The Liu du ji jing (Six Påramitå-sËtra) 53," 
Bauddhavidyåsudhåkara˙: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. 
Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Swisttal-Odendorf 1997 (IndTib 30), pp. 249-260. 
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attempts of the Buddha before his enlightenment to reach liberation after 
the manner of the Jainas. The passage from the third Bhåvanåkrama just 
cited states, similarly, that "nothing is to be thought on" (na kiµcic cintayi-
tavyam). Other indications show that suppression of mental activity, 
though rejected by the Buddha, came to characterise much that became 
known as Buddhist meditation. 
 Let us first look at the so-called eight Liberations (vimok∑a / vimok-
kha). They are the following: 
1) Having visible shape, one sees visible shapes 
2) Having no ideation of visible shape in oneself, one sees visible 
shapes outside [oneself] 
3) One becomes intent on what is beautiful 
4) By completely going beyond ideations of visible shape and the 
coming to an end of ideations of aversion, by not fixing one’s mind 
on different ideations, [thinking] ‘space is infinite’, he reaches the 
Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana / åkåsånañcåyatana) 
and remains there 
5) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of Space, 
[thinking] ‘knowledge is infinite’, one reaches the Stage of Infinity 
of Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana / viññåˆañcåyatana) and 
remains there 
6) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of 
Perception [thinking] ‘there is nothing’ one reaches the Stage of 
Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana / åkiñcaññåyatana) and remains 
there 
7) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Nothingness, one 
reaches the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation (naivasaµ-
jñånåsaµjñåyatana / nevasaññånåsaññåyatana) and remains there 
SELF AND MEDITATION IN INDIAN BUDDHISM  17 
 
 
8) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Neither Ideation nor 
Non-Ideation, one reaches the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings 
(saµjñåvedayitanirodha / saññåvedayitanirodha) and remains there. 
It is difficult to understand fully what exactly is meant by this series of 
stages, but there can be no doubt that it is a list of graded exercises by 
which the practitioner gradually puts an end to all ideations. In the Stage of 
Nothingness the most ethereal of ideations alone remain, described as 
“there is nothing”. In the following two states even this ideation disappears. 
Mental activity is in this way completely suppressed. 
 The Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana / åkåsånañcåy-
atana), the Stage of Infinity of Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana / 
viññåˆañcåyatana), the Stage of Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana / 
åkiñcaññåyatana) and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
(naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana / nevasaññånåsaññåyatana) often occur 
together in the Buddhist SËtras, also in other contexts. They are known by 
the name årËpya "Formless States". Independent evidence, from early 
Abhidharma this time, confirms that neither these Formless States nor the 
Cessation of Ideations and Feelings (saµ-jñåvedayitanirodha / 
saññåvedayitanirodha) were part of the Buddha's original teaching.12 And 
yet they came to be looked upon as central to Buddhist meditation. 
 
What can we conclude from the above observations? It is clear that the de-
velopment of Buddhism, already in India and already in the early centuries 
following the death of its founder, cannot be looked upon as the simple 
preservation of the teachings of the historical Buddha. Elements that had 
not been taught by him and even some that had been explicitly rejected by 
him found their way into the practices and theoretical positions of 
                                                
12 See my article "Dharma and Abhidharma" mentioned in note 1, above. 
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Buddhism. Other important developments, such as Abhidharma and 
perhaps also certain philosophical developments associated with 
Mahåyåna, came about as a result of attempts to order and systematise the 
Buddhist teachings. These and other factors have to be taken into account if 
one wishes to understand Buddhism in its historical development. 
 Similar reflection can be made when it comes to self and meditation 
in Buddhism. It seems certain that the Buddha never preached knowledge 
of the self as essential for reaching liberation. Yet his followers introduced 
this notion, first in a roundabout way, later directly in such forms as the 
tathågatagarbha. With regard to meditation we can be sure that the Buddha 
taught some kind of meditation — the four Dhyånas to be precise — as 
preliminary stages to the psychological transformation that constituted the 
aim of his teachings. His followers, once again, introduced other forms of 
meditation which had little to do with this psychological transformation, 
and much more with the originally non-Buddhist aim of immobilising the 
mind. 
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